A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid ToSave His Country

This is an important book which reminds us of two facts which must not be forgotten. 1. What the world thinks of the USA is vital for our security. Our military power is essential, but it will not keep us safe unless the rest of the world believes that we are working for the freedom and prosperity of all, and not just ourselves. 2. The CIA has an insoluble public relations problem. Its failures become public knowledge immediately, but its successes must be kept secret for twenty years or more.

The amazing story of Colonel Kuklinski and his work on behalf of the free world and America, resulted in many laudatory comments, but also an outrageous condemnation from pro-Communist sources. The understanding of this scurrilious attack will be helped by the recollection that our gallant ally, Poland, was abandoned at Yalta to the Soviet occupation, which lasted 46 years. During this time, some Poles were seduced, or bribed, to serve their Soviet masters and their interests. When the general discontent by the majority of the people, led by Solidarity, brought about the downfall of the Communist masters and their stooges, they naturally felt hate for the freedom-seeking patriots.The kangaroo Communist court sentenced Colonel Kuklinski to death just like they condemned so many patriots, and even the anti-German resistance fighters. To most Poles, Colonel Kuklinski is a hero and the cities of Krakow and Gdansk made him an honorary citizen. The regime henchmen could not reach the colonel but his two sons met with sudden death in suspicious circumstances in America. So he paid the highest price for his efforts on behalf of the free world and Poland.

A Secret Life will attract numerous audiences but holds special appeal for those who enjoy the mental challenge of wrestling with questions of moral dilemma. Colonel Kuklinski, the subject of the book, lived as a citizen of a country, Poland, during a time when Poland's national interests were subjugated to the interests of another nation. In sharing military intelligence with the American authorities, did Kuklinski act as a patriot whose mission was to protect Poland's freedom or as a traitor to its national security? The author's conclusions are clear from the phrase in the subtitle "the Price He Paid to Save His Country," but his meticulous research allows the reader to appraise the narrative at every step of Kuklinski's journey and to draw one's own conclusion. An absorbing tale that one constantly has to remind oneself is not fiction!

I heard many things about the martial law in Poland, and I read many books on the cold war. I think what Colonel Kuklinski did, was very dangerous and also heroic. In order to look at the martial law, everybody must ask himself/herself, where was Poland at this time? Was it free from foreign domination? Did Poland make indepedent decisions in regards to foreign policy or even internal policy? I think not. If those who think he is a traitor, then they think comunism was a good thing, and they enjoyed life under comunism. Most documents that Kuklinski shipped to Americans were in the Russian language. He did not take any money as some comunist members including Jaruzelski think. I am one of many, who met Colonel Kuklinski personally. He is a man of a great courage and patriotism. His sacrifice was that he lost his two sons, and did not receive recognition among the Poles. I believe that his sacrifices wiill find recogniztion if we will read this book.

History that really reads like a fast-paced novel. Should be a "crossover hit" for readers of spy or cold war fiction. The details on spycraft (how agents met, exchanged information and eluded surveillance, and how defectors were "expatriated") are particularly fascinating, and surprisingly were cleared by the CIA for publication.The final two chapters form an epilogue of sorts that gets to an especially important question, whether Kuklinski was a patriot or a traitor. The review from Publishers Weekly insinuates that money may have been a factor. While I agree that the author could have explored this in more detail, I find that charge to be without merit. First, while still in Poland, Kuklinski could not live beyond the means supplied by his and his wife's salaries without attracting attention. Second, he refused to defect until his cover was blown by a US leak (after 9 years of passing information) and he was placed in danger. I also disagree that too much ink was spent on the personal correspondence between Kulinski and his CIA contacts. His confidence in them as honorable people was crucial to his continuing to run great risks.The patriot vs. traitor question hinges largely on whether the Communist-era Polish state was legitimate or not. Kuklinski came to the view that it was not. It behaved more as a province of USSR with limited autonomy than as a fully independent nation. He could see this in military planning. Homeland defense was not considered. Apparently, the Soviets did not really expect to be invaded by NATO; they did, however, want no possible impediments to controlling their satellites. Meanwhile, the Polish army was trained to assist a Soviet-led war of aggression against Western Europe. Such a war would destroy Poland as NATO used nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact troops moving through it. Kuklinski also was troubled by the use of Polish troops for repression within the Soviet bloc, to end the "Prague Spring" in 1968 and to break Polish strikes in 1970.So, if the Polish state were merely the puppet of a malign foreign power (the USSR), patriotic Poles like Kuklinski theoretically should have had no qualms working with other foreign governments (like the US) to undermine it, just as Poles during the era of partition among Imperial Russia, Prussia/Imperial Germany and Imperial Austria could have clear consciences in opposing those regimes. A supreme irony is that, while Kuklinski was attempting to clear his name in the 1990s (after his defection in 1981, the Communist government condemned him to death in absentia for treason), he received the cold shoulder from Lech Walesa and certain other former Solidarity figures, who themselves had welcomed foreign aid for their anti-government movement. In part, they seemed to blame him for the failure of US officials to tip them off about the imposition of martial law by Gen. Jaruzelski, to which he was privy, and which occurred a month after his defection. In part, they seemed to think tha