An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics

1: Introduction

1.1: The Concepts of Personhood in African Philosophy

1.2: Developments in the Literature on Personhood

1.3: Themes and Structure of the Book

2: A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood

2.1: Introduction

2.2: Menkiti's Analysis of Personhood

2.3: Gyekye on Personhood

2.4: Matolino, Kaphagawani, and Ikuenobe on Personhood

2.5: Conclusion

3: An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory

3,1: Introduction

3.2: Being Human and Being a Person

3.3: Personhood Embodies a Character-Based Ethics

3.4: Means and Ends in Personhood

3.5: Humanism and the Instrumentality of Relationships

3.6: Rejection of Social Relationships as the Moral End

3.7: The Role of Relationships in Personhood

3.8: Conclusion

4: Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality

4.1: Introduction

4.2: Contextualising the debate Partiality and Impartiality in Moral Philosophy

4.3: Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality?

4.4: Conclusion

5: Personhood and Options in African Moral Thought

5.1: Introduction

5.2: Wiredu's Approach to Moral Philosophy

5.4: Conclusion

6: Personhood and Dignity in African Philosophy

6.1: Introduction

6.2: Ikuenobe's Conception of Dignity

6.3: Personhood and Dignity

6.4: Personhood, Partiality and Dignity

6.5: The Young and the Marginal Cases, and Dignity

7: Personhood as a Political Theory of Duties

7.1: Introduction

7.2: The Idea of Rights

7.3: Menkiti and Two Conceptions of Personhood

7.4: The Minimalist Conception of Personhood and Rights

7.5: The Maximalist Conception of Personhood and Duties

7.6: Conclusion