Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so much exercised as threatened. It is, Mr. Schelling says, bargaining power, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy--the diplomacy of violence. The author concentrates in this book on the way in which military capabilities--real or imagined--are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. He sees the steps taken by the U.S. during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to an enemy, with reports from the adversary's own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications. Even the bombing of North Vietnam, Mr. Schelling points out, is as much coercive as tactical, aimed at decisions as much as bridges. He carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Strategy and Arms Control (with Morton Halperin, 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and diplomacy. Stimson Lectures.Mr. Schelling is professor of economics at Harvard and acting director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. An exemplary text on the interplay of national purpose and military force.--Book Week. A grim but carefully reasoned and coldly analytical book. . . . One of the most frightening previews which this reviewer has ever seen of the roads that lie just ahead in warfare.--Los Angeles Times. A brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in the stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.--New York Times Book Review.
The focus of the book is put straightforwardly: "To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy--vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy." This book was first published in 1966 and it is a realpolitik examination of the use of coercive power in diplomacy. Important issues addressed include the centrality of making clear one's commitments, manipulating risk, the use of military action in bargaining. . . . A classic from the 1960s that can make for uncomfortable reading but which illustrates the hardball conceptualization of what we might term coercive diplomacy.
Getting more valuable with time...
Published by Thriftbooks.com User , 23 years ago
... because you can see some of the flaws in retrospect.Arms & Influence is a little repetitive, but still a fascinating look at the way countries can use war, violence, threats and generally nasty behavior to get what they want. Schelling analyzes war in terms of "bargaining" - i.e. we'll hit you this hard now to show we mean it, and ten times harder if you don't give us what you want next week. The theory explains a lot - but if you take it too far it can be too clever by half. One of his examples of a precise, well-considered and effective strike intended to deliver a clear message that an adversary would have to recognize is the Johnson Administration's retaliation for the Tonkin Gulf incident. The book was written in early 1965.
An excellent read for anybody, regardless of your field.
Published by Thriftbooks.com User , 26 years ago
I read this book for a political science class in advanced international relations theory. Even considering the topic of the class, I couldn't put this book down. Schelling writes for the average reader on subjects everybody can use in their daily lives, and applies them to international relations. Regardless of your area of study, this book offers something for everybody.
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