Policy and the Military Operational Artist: Exploring the Civil-Military Dialogue and Implications for the Art of Large-Scale Military Operations - Ei

The need for the military operational artist to recognize the evolving requirement for parallel and corresponding military and political aims is more critical than ever. Within the modern environment, operational artists will operate in conflicts like Carl von Clausewitz's real wars of limited aims. This monograph seeks to answer what is the role of the military operational artist in resolving political and military aims in forming and maintaining a coherent emergent strategy in consonance with the political aim. In these conflicts the operational artist must provide politically aware military advice while in the policy dialogue, exhibit flexibility through reframing and discourse during the military aim and emergent strategy dialogue, and to be cognizant of the perceptions of victory and defeat while in the perception dialogue because these directly influence the policy makers' future decision for the conflict. Operational artists and doctrine must be flexible and account for these political influences and be prepared to operate in conflicts where they cannot pursue an absolute military aim. This regular dialogue with the policy maker will help an operational artist understand the political priorities, constraints, and risks of the policy maker and enable the operational artist to provide the best politically aware military advice. The methodology utilized to demonstrate the role and actions of the military operational artist consists of a case study comparison between General Eisenhower during the Second World War and General MacArthur during the Korean War. The Korea case study demonstrates how divergent aims can have a corrosive effect on a coherent strategy.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Section 1: Introduction * Section 2: Eisenhower, Roosevelt, and Churchill: Symmetry between an Absolute Political Aim and a War with the Military Aim of Final Victory * Part I: Initial Policy Interaction: Inter-Allied Conferences 1941-1943 and the Initial Decision for the Cross-Channel Attack * Part II: Final Policy Interaction: Inter-Allied Conferences Cairo-Tehran 1943 and the Final Decision for the Cross-Channel Attack * Part III: Assessment and Perception * Section 3: MacArthur and Truman during the Korean War: The Asymmetry Inherent between Limited Political Aims and Limited Military Means * Part I: History of the Korean Peninsula and the Story of Two Koreas * Part II: Policy Interaction I- Restore the 38th Parallel * Part III: Policy Interaction II: Drive to the Yalu River and Unify Korea * Part IV Policy Iteration III: Negotiated Settlement for the Conflict * Part V: Assessment and Perception * Conclusion