Origins of the Second World War

When this reviewer read A.J.P. Taylor's THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, he was impressed by the research, scholarship, and concise written experssion. Taylor argued that the Hitler regime never planned to enter a "total war," and a total war was the last thing the Germans wanted. Taylor convincingly demonstrates this thesis in this book. Taylor begins his study with some forgotten problems that "mainstream" historians, those historians who are too timid or too politically connected, refuse to handle due to preconceived conclusions which Taylor undermines. The facts are that while the Germans lost World War I on the Western Front, the Germans did indeed win World War I against the Russians and extraced a peace treaty from the new revolutionary regime under Lenin (Treaty of Brest-Litvosk). The subsequent Versailles "Peace" Conference (1919) unhinged German victorians in the East. Taylor also unhinges the myths that Hitler was solely responsible for unraveling the unjust and tentative conditions of the Versailles settlement. For example, Taylor carefully examines the Anschluss between the Germans and the Austrians in 1938. This event was not planned by the Hitler regime, and the crisis was started by the Austrian Chancellor Schnussnig and not by Hitler. Schnussnig provoked a rebellion in Austria when he tried to used armed force to crush the Austrian National Socialists and lost political control. The Germans were the only ones who were seen as able to restore order. The crisis caught the Germans by surprise. When the Germans sent military and police forces Austria, over 70% of the vehicles malfunctioned. There was no carefully planned operation to take control. The crisis a totally unexpected political favor. In an attempt to legitimatize the Anschluss, he submitted the matter to the Austrians for a plebiscite. The vote was 99.08% in favor of the Anschluss and only .92% against it, "...a genuine reflection of German feeling." Taylor further gives a more precise account of the Sudetenlan situation of the subsequent Munich conference in 1938. The French and British were branded as "appeasers" by lazy historians who are not aware of the situation. Taylor argues that the Czechs and Eastern Europeans would not be well served by war. If one looks at a map of Europe, they should realize that Czechoslovakia is Eastern Europe, and there was little that the British or French could do if war did result. One should note that the Czechs, British, French, etc. were very concerned about possible Soviet military intervention and fears of Big Communism moving west into Central Europe. One should also note that when the Germans moved into the rest of Czechoslovakia, Hocha, the Czech foreig minister, asked for German help because of fears of Polish, Soviet, and Hungarian dismantling the rest of the country. Taylor handles the critics of these events. Taylor argues that the Czechs were "betrayed" while, later in 1939, the Polish were "sa

Taylor's contribution to the literature on the Second World Waris a must read. He exhaustively researched the diplomatic dealingsthat preceded the outbreak of war and provided a wealth ofinformation. He shows that neither was Hitler simply a raving,irrational madman, nor were the British, French and other leadersparagons of virtue and sterling defenders of democratic ideals. As inmost cases in history in which "high politics" are involved, thediplomatic dealings occuring on the eve of World War II show that itis difficult to clearly distinguish between the "good" and the"bad" - even when detestable ghouls like Hitler areinvolved. Another important aspect of Taylor's work here is to showhow much history is more than just a series of broad processes, butalso a matter of minute human interactions. Thus, one can only go sofar in explaining the Second World War in terms of socio-economicfactors (which were, to be sure, crucial) - one also has to look athow events are the result of actions taken by powerful leaders andtheir back-room dealings with each other. All in all, an excellent andvery illuminating book. END

Taylor's account of the origins of the war is a fascinating dive into the twisted saga that was the Third Reich. Propounding the theory that Hitler was a master of patience who let the Appeasment-happy politicians of the West hand Czechoslovakia, Austria, and eventually Poland over to him, Taylor's arguments are compelling and definitive. While not detracting from the horrors of the Reich, it becomes clear that the political aspect of Hitler's empire was focused on getting the most he could while avoiding war, not planning for or encouraging it. The second edition contains Taylor's reply (in a forward) to the many critics and historians who debased the work as monstrous upon its initial publication, but like all the best of Taylor's work, it seeks only to dig for the truth, not an absolution of morality.

Dubbed as a "revisionist history" when the book was first written, A.J.P. Taylor's scholarship has withstood the test of time and a fresh reading is testimony to his prophetic skills. Mr. Taylor's work demonstrates that there are no blacks and whites but only grays in the world of realpolitik. His work is both for the casual reader as well as for students of history. (Naushad Shafkat)