This is a probing narrative of the history which came to its climax at Pearl harbor; an account of the attitudes and actions, of the purposes and persons which brought about the war between the United States and Japan. It is full and impartial. Though written as an independent and private study, records and information of an exceptional range and kind were used in its making. These give it authority. They include all the pertinent State Department papers; the American official military records in preparation; selections from the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park; the full private diaries of Stimons, Morgenthau, and Grew; the file of the intercepted "Magic" cables; and equivalent collections of official and private Japanese records. The author was at the time in the State Department (as Adviser on International Economic Affairs) and thus in close touch with the men and matters of which he writes. In telling how this war came about, this book tells much of how other wars happen. For it is a close study of the ways in which officials, diplomats, and soldiers think and act; of the environment of decision, of the ambitions of nations, of the clash of their ideas, of the way sin which fear and mistrust affect events, and of the struggle for time and advantage. The narrative follows events in a double mirror of which one side is Washington and the other Tokyo, and synchronizes the images. Thus it traces the ways in which the acts and decisions of this country influenced Japan and vice versa. Originally published in 1950. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, continues to be of great interest to historians and conspiracy theorists, even more so since the terror attack of 9/11. How could America have been taken by surprise? Why were we so unprepared? Whose fault was it? Politics, including demagoguery and scapegoating of the worst kind, heavily influenced the investigations of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. To this day, no one knows with certainty exactly what FDR's knowledge and intentions were. There is no question in anyone's mind that he knew America was headed for war eventually. If a war had to be fought FDR wanted that war to be fought on the best terms possible for America. He clearly felt American interests lay in preventing the defeat of Britain, and he went far beyond the accepted limits of Presidential power to further that end. Did he go so far as to deliberately put the Pacific Fleet in harm's way, hoping the Japanese would attack it on US territory and thus mobilize public opinion in favor of war? No one knows, and no one may ever know. It is certainly conceivable in my mind that he did so, but it is yet unproven. What is clear in all I have read about Pearl Harbor, Feis included, is that the high levels of US government were not in the least surprised by the timing of the Japanese attack, just by its location. The Philippines and Guam were expected to bear the brunt of any Japanese attack, with Pearl Harbor being a theoretical but less likely target. Japanese intentions were very clear to FDR and his cabinet - only the American people were in the dark. A larger question raised by Pearl Harbor is that of whether war with Japan could have been avoided entirely if relations between Japan and the US had been better managed. Herbert Feis' book is one of the early and authoritative attempts to address this question. Feis was a retired diplomat and historian. He won the 1960 Pulitzer Prize for his book "Between War and Peace" on the origins of the Cold War. The American Historical Association has named an award after Feis that goes to independent scholars, not associated with academic institutions. (David Walley has written an interesting on-line biography of Feis.) There is no question that Feis was very knowledgeable about diplomatic affairs and had mastered the voluminous reports of the Pearl Harbor investigations and the diplomatic memorandums and cables of the period. Much information has become available since Feis published this book in 1950, especially on the Japanese side, but nothing has emerged since then to contradict the basic outline of the story. It's a complicated story, to say the least. Relations had deteriorated considerably between the US and Japan long before Feis picks up the thread in 1937, when what he calls "the last good chance" for a peaceful settlement was lost by Japan's increasingly ruthless actions in China. Japanese disregard for American commercial interests in China
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