While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today

I did enjoy reading it. It is a well researched book. I found the similarities between Britain in the 1920s and 1930s and the United States today an interesting idea. The central thesis is that both these powers had too small a military for its needs and that this is the cause of many of its problems in national policy. The writers then take us on a journey of both countries policies and point out where they feel this is shown out.Although I do agree that both had large commitments and that their military although big by world standards was too small for their needs. I cannot agree in almost all of the examples quoted where a stronger force would have changed much. As the writers point out the British forces were stronger enough to handle the Turks in 1920 if they really wanted too. The results of this conflict from the British point of view were quite satisfactory. A pro Western and neutral Turkey controlling this important region developed out of this conflict. A larger Greece would still have fallen under Nazi control and by controlling more of the region would have been worse for the Allies then what did happen. I would agree that this conflict certainly was a lot bloodier particularly to Greeks. then it should have been. Later on with other crisis's such as the Corfu, monitoring Versailles, Ethiopia, the Rhineland and Munich in all these occasions the British suffered from lack of will not lack of military force. If the will had been their, then the military was strong enough.These arguments would also be true of many of the examples quoted of the US too for example in 1990s both in Yugoslavia and Iraq. A stronger military at best could be said to give more confidence to the decision makers.The real lesson in the book is that victorious powers often after the war must have the willingness to enforce the peace they fought for. Overall it is certainly a worth while read.

While America Sleeps" is an engaging, insightful work of comparative history.Life of Americans in Danger! Life of Humans in Danger! A Book by Donal Kagan is the perception of self delusion, military weakness and threat to peace today. Using Great Britain between the wars as a point of comparison for the US today, the authors outline the great dangers faced as a nation. The book refers that US has taken a huge "peace dividend" and gutted it's military since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, US foreign policy has been consistently erratic, misguided and low over the same period. When confronted with aggression, US has failed and totally ineffective and a half hearted stand. Bush administration had many of the right ideas about the role of a lone superpower, but failed to implement them. This was due largely to a failure to educate the public, and a lingering "Vietnam Syndrome" that continues to plague the military. They go on to lambast the Clinton administration for both failing to understand the dynamic of global relations, and for utterly misapplying military force. The Author foreshadows impending doom and the book is thought-provoking treatise on the role of military power in foreign policy.It challenges the lack of will in political leaders and controversially disturbing warning against over reliance on air power and technological superiority. Its time to think 'America in Danger! Life of Humans in Danger!

Unfortunately, most won't, but if just a few of our leaders would, we'd be on the right track."While America Sleeps" is an engaging, insightful work of comparative history. Using Great Britain between the wars as a point of comparison for the US today, the authors outline the great dangers we face as a nation. In much the same way that Britain demobilized after WWI, the US has taken a huge "peace dividend" and gutted it's military since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, US foreign policy has been consistently erratic, misguided and timid over the same period.By using well known examples like Iraq, North Korea and the Balkans, the authors illustrate how the US has failed to make a strong stand when confronted with aggression. Furthermore, when a stand is made, it is usually ineffective and half-hearted. They describe how the Bush (the 1st) administration had many of the right ideas about the role of a lone superpower, but failed to implement them. This was due largely to a failure to educate the public, and a lingering "Vietnam Syndrome" that continues to plague the military. They go on to lambast (and rightly so) the Clinton administration for both failing to understand the dynamic of global relations, and for utterly misapplying military force.Make no mistake, while the Kagan's have a point to make, this is not a work of theory. The history is excellent, and makes superb use of primary sources. It is the quality of the research and writing, and the urgency of the conclusion that make this book. The author's opinions are clear, but neither dogmatic, nor partisan.

Two proven historians, a father-son team, draw stark comparisons between the post World War I period in which Britain took a gigantic "peace dividend" and allows its national defenses to crumble, and the post Cold War period in which America has done the same. Those who trust the Kagan's analysis-as does the distinguished Colin Gray, master of strategic thinking-may skip the first half of the book and go directly to the second half focusing on the American experience. This is not, as some might claim, an ideological treatise. It is firmly grounded in history and the authors strive to present a balanced reasonable theme. I believe they succeed. Even for those steeped in the literature of the American military, there are new lessons in this book. Perhaps the three most important lessons are these: 1) regional threats can become global threats without sufficient warning such as is necessary to reconstitute global defenses; 2) successful diplomacy is best founded on the immediate availability of armed force that can be projected to any point on the globe with great credibility; 3) national security, unlike domestic policies, is not something to be achieved by consensus-this is where the President earns their keep, by guiding and forging a consensus in the absence of domestic constituencies for spending on external affairs and external security. Especially gripping for anyone who anticipates a future in which Dick Cheney and Colin Powell have something to say about our national security, is the authors' analysis of their strategic decisions following the Cold War. Both Cheney and Powell get very high marks for understanding that global strength is a pre-requisite for stability and security. The Powell vision for a Base Force with Atlantic, Pacific, Strategic, and Contingency force elements is categorized as brilliant. Powell does, however, get very low marks for being consistently unwilling to use force to impose order in the absence of clear objectives-the authors are very clear in calling the Weinberger Doctrine (setting conditions under which force may be used) completely out of date and at odds with today's needs. Both President Bush and Chairman Powell are severely castigated for having ended the Gulf War too soon and without a decisive result-the author's compare this to the similarly indecisive outcome of World War I, an outcome that left the aggressors strong enough to come back and fight another day. The authors then go on to systematically review a series of major foreign policy and defense failures in the Clinton administration, an Administration characterized by a consistent failure to understand and address the mismatch between wandering and vacillating foreign policies and attendant commitments, and the real-world capabilities of a declining military force. Especially dangerous, in the authors' view, was the Bottom Up Review approach that abandoned the Cheney-Powell appreciation for maintaining sufficient force to deter two

"America is in danger."With a single, direct statement, historians Donald and Frederick Kagan embark on a complex journey that traces the imminent fall of the American dynasty. Exploring the nuances of national security policy, engagement strategy, and the apparent decline of the military, the Kagans offer a provocative portrait of the collapse of modern Rome, a latter-day empire suffering from self-delusion and a general unwillingness to face the inescapable responsibilities upon which the peace and security of the world depend.In While America Sleeps, the authors draw on historical comparisons with the experiences of Great Britain during the interwar years to build the foundation of their thesis. Following the Treaty of Versailles, Britain was in a position similar to that of America following the Cold War. Postured to exert a major international influence, the British instead slashed their military force structure while assuring themselves that conditions of world peace and technological superiority would more than offset any reductions in strength. But, as the authors state, industry failed to maintain the technological advantage and civilian and military planners did not institute the organizational changes necessary to leverage existing technologies into effective weapons of war.Britain's declining military, itself facing a burgeoning inability to influence major regional competitors, virtually paralyzed foreign policy during the interwar years. In an era that necessitated an active strategy of engagement, the Kagans assert that Great Britain failed to respond to any crises with decisive action, forsaking her responsibilities as the leading global power of the time. Instead, Britain deluded herself with halfhearted claims of "victory" in a series of indecisive political-military engagements with Iraq, Italy, and Turkey. "The sum of these defeats, though portrayed as victories," according to the Kagans, "had a devastating effect on England's positions at the turn of the decade." The world, especially "regional" competitors such as Germany and Japan, began to see that Britain's "bark was far worse than her bite."America, according to the authors, is already following a similar path of destruction. We have already mortgaged any technological superiority we possess with the assertion that we have assumed a "strategic pause" that essentially compels our military forces to delay necessary modernization for at least a decade. While the nation enjoys a greater economic prosperity than at any time in our history, the military is struggling through an era of "constrained resources." When the time finally arrives for America to call upon her armed forces - as she inevitably will, the authors contend - the cost and the time required to repair the damage will be an near-insurmountable obstacle. The United States may again earn her reputation as a country that routinely loses the "first battle" in a time when we can least afford to suffer def